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Abstract 
 
The aim of this study is to investigate the influence of state ownership in 
Saudi firms listed in the stock market. The first chapter studies the influence of 
state ownership on financial constraint on investment. Some scholars believe state 
ownership has a negative effect on the firm value. However, by using two measures 
of financial constraint, the investment cash flow sensitivity and the Kaplan and 
Zingales financial constraints index, the finding indicates that the existent of 
government ownership decreases financial constraint in firms. Also, the results 
show that the higher government ownership percentage the less financial constraint 
in firms. The second chapter studies the influence of specific company factors and 
the government ownership factor on capital structure. The finding shows that 
tangibility of assets and size have a positive association with leverage. Leverage is 
negatively correlated with growth and profitably. Finally, the results suggest that 
government ownership affects the level of leverage negatively. 
 
JEL Classification: G14, G11, G31, G32. 
  
Keywords: Privatization; State ownership; Financial Constraint, Capital Structure.
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CHAPTER 1 
Does Government Ownership Relax Financing Constraints on Investment? 
Evidence from Saudi Arabia 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The opinion of those government-owned firms that have lower performance 
than non-government owned firms has been believed by many scholars. The 
government-owned firms are known as inefficient firms and they could perform 
better if they were under private ownership. Many studies report the low 
performance of state-owned firms comparing with fully private firms. Dewenter and 
Malatesta (2001) show that government companies have lower net income. Alfaraih, 
Alanezi, Almujamed (2012) find an adverse correlation between state ownership 
and firm performance in firms listed on Kuwait stock exchange, indicating that 
government ownership decreases market performance. Also, Boubakri, Guedhami, 
Kwok and Saffar (2016) conclude that the higher government ownership in firms 
causes poorer performance, less value, less productivity, and less risk-taking. 
However, government ownership may signify to the market because it affords 
firm credibility and assures investors, markets, and suppliers since the government 
is willing to protect deals with these sides. Eljelly (2009) finds that government-
related companies in Saudi Arabia manage to generally perform better than private 
companies with regard to income and operating efficiently. The reason for this 
better performance is that the Saudi government manages economic development 
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by owning fully or partially major companies such as oil and petrochemical 
companies. 
Financial constraints have a negative effect on companies. This effect 
influences the performances and values. Campello, Graham, and Harvey (2010) 
investigate whether corporate expenditure strategies vary conditional on the case of 
financial constraint, they conclude to that throughout the credit crisis in 2008, 
many firms avoid attractive projects opportunities due to the inability to externally 
borrow. Cleary (1999) studies the relationship between financial status and firms 
investments; he argues that firm investment decisions are directly related to 
financial factors. 
In this study, I would like to add to the literature by examining the influence 
of government ownership on the level of financial constraints of firms in the case 
where the government may have a positive effect. The aim of this research is to 
examine the differences of influences of financial constraint among the Saudi listed 
government-related firms and the Saudi listed private firms. Many studies have 
discussed the influence of the state ownership on the level of financial constraints in 
the Chinese firms such as Poncet, Steingress, and Vandenbussche (2010) and 
Guariglia, Liu, and Song (2011). My study is different than previous studies in 
many aspects. I emphasize the study on only the listed companies with government 
ownership while the previous studies use both listed and non-listed companies. The 
difference here is the influence of government ownership on the listed and non-
listed companies. In my opinion, listed companies with government ownership 
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usually are clearer and have improved corporate governance mechanisms than the 
non-listed. Also, listed companies with government ownership are more open to 
market scrutiny thus they are more reactive to the market environment than non-
listed companies with government ownership. Moreover, the previous studies use 
only one measure of the financial constraints on the investments, which is the 
investment cash flow sensitivity. Since there is no optimal measure of the financial 
constraints, the previous studies need for the robustness check. In this paper, I use 
two measures of the financial constraints on the investments, the investment cash 
flow sensitivity and the developed Kaplan and Zengales index of the financial 
constraints to study the influence of the government ownership and level of the 
financial constraints. Also, I control for the effect of the Seasoned Equity Offerings 
of companies. Finally, this is the first paper to study the influence of government 
ownership on the level of financial constraints among Saudi companies. Since the 
financial position of the Saudi government is strong, it is likely that government 
ownership has a positive influence on the level of financial constraints of companies 
comparing to the companies without government ownership. Also, It is expected this 
positive influence increases by the increase of government ownership. This study 
addresses several questions that are related to government ownership and financial 
constraints. 
Using data of the nonfinancial Saudi listed firms. I follow Lin and Bo (2012) 
and I use two measures to measures the level of financial constraints. First, I use a 
standard investment equation, which is a pool of two models, accelerator type 
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investment and investment Tobin’s Q. Second, I use the developed Kaplan and 
Zingales financial constraints index by Lamont, Polk, and Saa-Requejo (2001). The 
findings support the two hypotheses, the related government firms suffer less 
financial constraint than the fully privatized firms and the more government 
ownership percent the less level of financial constraint in the Saudi stock market. 
The results indicate that Saudi’s privatization plan is going to make an influence in 
the terms of the soft budget constraints that the government-linked companies are 
characterized by.  
This finding of the relationship between government ownership and financial 
constraints in companies can be explained as either way, it can be evidence for the 
opinion of that government ownership creates value to government-linked 
companies since it supports the companies by decreasing their financial constraints, 
or it can be evidence for the government involvement continues to bring in soft 
budget constraints to government-linked companies 
This study adds to the literature of the state ownership in a different aspect, 
where the state ownership affects positively companies’ values. Also, the study 
contributes to the literature of financial constraints, and financial markets. Also, it 
helps to give an explanation of the influence of government ownership on the firms’ 
values with financial constraints.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follow. Section 2 provides a literature 
review. The hypotheses of the study are presented in section 3. The data and the 
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methodology are in section 4 and 5, respectively. Section 6 describes the results of 
the investment-cash flow sensitivity measure. Section 7 shows the KZ index and the 
result. Finally, section 8 completes the study. 
2. Literature Review 
The effects of government ownership have been discussed as a related factor 
to the efficiency. Some scholars argue that government ownership affects efficiency 
negatively. Ramamurti (1987) argues that government-linked companies (GLCs) 
goal is other than a wealth-maximizing goal. Krueger (1990) believes that there as a 
lot of pressure on GLCs to employ politically related people while there are better 
professional people who can be hired. Also, Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1996) say 
that the government may force GLCs to hire excess employs. Another reason for the 
low-efficiency performance in GLCs can be related to the bureaucratic in 
management (Chang and Singh 1997). Moreover, there are no sufficient motivations 
for managers to follow efficiency and profitability. However, Jones (1991) argues 
that privatization delivers management of government-linked companies to clear 
goals about what government policies need. Conversely, Christensen (1998) finds 
that government-owned organizations in some states have low-efficiency 
performance even after reorganizations are announced. Micco and Panizza (2007) 
study the connection between ownership in banks and performance among data of 
commercial banks in 179 states. They find government-owned banks operating have 
poorer income and greater expenses than the non-government-owned banks.   
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As some scholars find a negative effect of government ownership. Some 
scholars support the firm out-performance with government ownership. Dewenter 
and Malatesta (1997) contend that governments can monitor the GLCs chiefs better 
than isolated stakeholders in non-GLCs. Chang and Singh (1997) argue that GLCs 
do not always have lower efficiency than private companies. 
Some scholars attempt to investigate the concept of ownership structure 
effects. McGuiness and Ferguson (2005) measure two kinds of ownership structure 
amongst Chinese listed corporations. They examine the influences of government 
and foreign ownership on the performance of companies in China. They find that 
there is a negative connection between free-float size and company performance. 
Additionally, they find that foreign ownership state is not correlated with company 
performance.  
Some scholars claim that government ownership signifies a significant 
indication to the market because it provides firm credibility and guarantees 
financiers and markets, and suppliers because of the government ability to protect 
dealings with them. Bourdman and Vining (1989) study ownership depends on 
three groups of ownership: state-owned, non-state-owned, and mixed owned. They 
find that fractional privatization is a better plan for a government that does not 
want the state ownership form. Ang and Ding (2006) compare the GLCs and the 
fully privatized companies in term of financial and market performance in 
Singapore. The finding shows that corporate governance and the valuations in 
GLCs are better and higher. Omran (2004) shows that there is no development 
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difference in performance in Egyptian non-state-owned companies and state-linked 
corporations. Kole and Mulherin (1997) study the case in the United States and 
Bozec (2003) in Canada find Similar results for different reasons. 
The financial status of firms with the presence of financial constraints has 
been investigated in many studies. Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) study the 
company investment choices in case of financial constraints. They classify 
companies based on the cash holdings using Value Line data of 422 U.S. companies 
for the period of 1970 to 1984 to analysis variances of investment behavior. They 
say that companies with better cash holding ratios have higher informational 
asymmetry difficulties and are expected to be cash constrained. The companies’ 
investments that use internal cash are more affected to variations of cash flow that 
companies’ investments with great dividend firms. Following studies find similar 
results. Hoshi, Kashyap and scharfstein (1991) conclude to that the expenditures of 
investment in Japanese companies that are not keiretsu partners, financial 
business conglomerates, are more affected to the liquidity than the corporations 
that are keiretsu partners so they are supposed to have fewer financially 
constrained. Oliner and Rudebusch (1992) find that companies stocks that are 
traded over-the-counter, their investment is more affected to cash flow and that 
have insider-trading behavior according to internal information. Similar results are 
found by Schaller (1993) in Canadian companies. Whited (1992) and Bond and 
Meghir (1994) use the Euler equation method to examine the first-order condition of 
an intertemporal maximization. The approach is applied by using an exogenous 
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constraint on external finance and examining if the constraint is required for a 
specific group of corporations. They conclude to the external finance constraint to be 
required for the constrained groups of companies. 
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) have a different conclusion. They classify 
companies based on the level of financial constraint. A corporation is categorized as 
financially constrained if the price of external finance eliminates the corporation 
from entering investments. Opposing to previous studies, the finding shows that the 
smallest financially constrained corporations to have the highest cash flow influence 
of investment. Kaplan and Zingales (1997) claim that high sensitivity cannot be 
indicated as evidence of financial constraints.  
Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) use an alternate method to 
determent whether costly external finance influences financial policies. Instead of 
concentrating on the sensitivity of investment to cash flow, they concentrate on the 
cash flow sensitivity of cash. Financially constrained companies should have a 
logical tendency to save cash, whereas unconstrained companies should not exhibit 
this tendency. Using numerous ways for classifying companies into financially 
constrained and unconstrained, the authors conclude that the cash flow sensitivity 
of cash is positive for financially constrained companies and it is statistically 
insignificant for financially unconstrained companies.  
Almeida and Campello (2007) analyses the variance influence of asset 
tangibility on the investment to cash flow sensitivity within different cases of 
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financial constraints. They apply this method to a large sample of manufacturing 
companies covering the period between 1985 and 2000. They find that tangibility of 
asset can determine whether a company suffers from credit constraints - companies 
with higher tangible assets can enjoy better access to external financial resources. 
The credit multiplier has a significant influence on investment when companies 
suffer from credit constraints, the sensitivities of investment-cash flow are rising in 
the level of the tangibility of constrained companies' assets. However, the 
sensitivities of investment-cash flow are not affected by asset tangibility if the 
companies are unconstrained. Their finding supports their hypothesis of the asset 
tangibility role in corporate investment under financial constraints. 
Nevertheless, the literature analyses the determinants of cash holdings. 
Opler et al. (1999) show that cash holdings are negatively correlated to the degree 
and the availability of a bond rating. That is, corporations with a bond rating under 
the investment grade and those that have no bond rating available hold more cash 
than corporations that have an investment-grade bond rating. Kim, Mauer, and 
Sherman (1998) and Harford (1999) report similar finding, cash holdings are 
positively related to the volatility of industry cash flow. Also, the findings support 
the results of Opler et al. (1999), financially constrained corporations hold more 
cash than unconstrained corporations. 
The influence of state ownership on the level of financial constraints has been 
discussed in some studies. Poncet, Steingress, and Vandenbussche (2010) 
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investigate the presence of credit constraints in Chinese firms for the period of 
1998-2005. They organize the enterprises into three different enterprises 
classifications based on the shareholder's types, private enterprises, SOEs, and 
foreign-invested enterprises. They use cash flow as a proxy for internal finance and 
they estimate every group separately. The study finds that the cash flow coefficients 
are insignificant for the group of SOEs and foreign-invested enterprises while in the 
group of private enterprises, the cash flow coefficient is positive and significant. The 
authors conclude that SOEs and foreign-invested enterprises do not face financial 
constraints while private enterprises do. Guariglia, Liu, and Song (2011) use a 
dynamic assets growth model for the same enterprise's classifications obtain by 
Poncet, Steingress, and Vandenbussche (2010) for the period of 2000-2007. 
Guariglia, Liu, and Song (2011) use a dynamic assets growth model and cash flow 
as a proxy for internal finance. The finding is similar to the results of Poncet, 
Steingress, and Vandenbussche (2010), SOEs do not face financial constraints. 
There are few studies have analyzed the issue of the investment behavior of 
privatized former SOEs in transition economies. Lizal and Svejnar (2002) discover 
that SOEs and former SOEs were less profitable and enjoyed more bank credits in 
industrial companies in the Czech Republic. The findings show that during the 
transition period SOEs and former SOEs invested at a greater rate than more 
profitable other companies and operated under the soft budget constraint. 
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Firth, Lin, and Wong (2008) study the influence of state ownership on the 
monitoring and disciplinary influence of leverage on investment of Chinese 
companies. The results show that the companies with a greater state ownership 
ratio have a less negative correlation between leverage and investment, indicating a 
less monitoring role of debt in the company with greater state ownership ratio.  
Finally, these studies conclude that companies with high state ownership 
ratio in transition economies still have some level of the soft budget constraint. 
Nevertheless, as I discussed in section one, there are some issues with the previous 
studies. First, I emphasize the study on only the listed companies with government 
ownership while the previous studies use both listed and non-listed companies. The 
difference here is the influence of government ownership on the listed and non-
listed companies. In my opinion, listed companies with government ownership 
usually are clearer and have improved corporate governance mechanisms than the 
non-listed. Also, listed companies with government ownership are more open to 
market scrutiny thus they are more reactive to the market environment than non-
listed companies with government ownership. Second, the previous studies use only 
one measure of the financial constraints on the investments, which is the 
investment cash flow sensitivity. Since there is no optimal measure of the financial 
constraints, the previous studies need for the robustness check. In this paper, I use 
two measures of the financial constraints on the investments, the investment cash 
flow sensitivity and the developed Kaplan and Zengales index of the financial 
constraints to study the influence of the government ownership and level of the 
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financial constraints. Third, I control for the effect of the Seasoned Equity Offerings 
of companies. 
3. Hypotheses 
The fact that Saudi government financial position is strong and the 
government manages the economic development by owning partially major 
companies arises a question about how the government affects the financial 
positions in the corporations listed in the Saudi stock market. Especially, when 
considering the Saudi 2030 vision that aims to fully or partially privatize more 
state-owned assets, which is going to affect the government-linked firms' 
performance in the future. 
The government-related companies in Saudi Arabia manage to perform 
better than private companies with regard to income and operating efficiently 
Eljelly (2009). Cleary (1999) finds that investments are related to direct financial 
status. Taking into account these two studies, I hypotheses that government-related 
firms have less financial constraints compared to private firms in Saudi Arabia.  
H1: Government-related firms have less financial constraints 
Gunasekarage and et al. (2007) find that state ownership has influenced on 
firms performance at a high level of state ownership. Since I expect a positive 
influenced of the state ownership, I hypotheses that the level of financial 
constraints decreases as government ownership increases. 
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H2: The level of financial constraints decreases as government ownership 
increases 
4. Data 
The data I use in the study is quarterly and it covers nonfinancial companies 
listed on the Saudi stock market for the period of 2010 to 2017. The accounting data 
comes from global Campustat. Data of government ownership is hand collected. 
Saudi government ownership can be in three forms, the public investments funds 
(PIF), the general organization for social insurance and the public pension agency. 
The total number of firms included in the study is 86 firms. The government owns 
partially in 31 firms. Table 1 presents summary statistics for the full sample. 
The mean average of the investment to total assets is 0.02. The mean average 
of Tobin’s-Q is 1.48. The mean average of cash flow to total assets is 0.03. The 
average of government ownership percentage is 0.07. The size average is 21.72. The 
mean average of the sales growth is 0.02. The majority of the sample did not use 
equity financing over the sample term. Finally, the average total debt to total assets 
is 0.29.  
Table 2 shows summary statistics for the linked government firms. Table 3 
shows summary statistics for the fully privatized firms. The mean average of the 
investment to total assets is about 0.02 for both subsamples. The average of Tobin’s-
Q is a little better for the fully privatized firms' sample. The ability to make 
internal funds is slightly higher in the linked government firms. The average mean 
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of government ownership is about %20 in linked government firms. The mean 
average of the sales growth is little higher in linked government firms (0.03) while 
for the privatized firms is only 0.02. Finally, the average of total debt to total assets 
is 0.31 for the linked government firms and 0.29 for the fully privatized firms. 
5. Methodology  
To analysis the influence of the Saudi government on the degree of financing 
constraints in companies, I follow Lin and Bo (2012) and I use a standard 
investment equation, which is a pool of two models, accelerator type investment and 
investment Tobin’s Q. Because the Saudi stock market is not very well developed, I 
use sales growth rate and Tobin’s Q together to take into account investment 
fundamentals to avoid any problems can be caused by market-based variables. The 
standard investment equation is: 
[
𝐼
𝐾
]
𝑖,t
=  𝛽1 [
𝐼
𝐾
]
𝑖,t−1
+ 𝛽2 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽4 [
𝐶𝐹
𝐾
]
𝑖,t−1
+ 𝛽5 [
𝐷
𝐾
]
𝑖,t−1
+ 𝛽6 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛽7 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8 𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 …(1) 
I, is the investment and it is the difference between the fixed assets for the 
present year and the fixed assets for the prior year adding depreciation. K is the 
whole assets as a measure for the capital stock. Sale is the yearly growth ratio of 
sales. Q is Tobin’s Q, indicating the firms’ investment chances and it is estimated as  
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Table 1 
 
The table shows summary statistics for quarterly data of nonfinancial companies listed in the Saudi stock 
market covering the term of 2010 – 2017. Note that (I/K) is the fraction of investment to whole assets. Q is 
Tobin’s Q, (CF/K) is the fraction of cash flow to whole assets. State is the percentage of shares held by the 
government, Size is the natural logarithm of whole assets, Sales is the yearly growth rate of sales, Leverage is a 
fraction of whole debt to whole assets and SEO is the seasoned equity offering dummy and it equals 1 if 
seasoned equity offering exists. 
 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
     
(I/K) 0.018 0.078 -2.344 0.707 
Q  1.484 0.650 0.792 2.799 
(CF/K)  0.026 0.019 0.001 0.059 
State  0.067 0.112 0.000 0.325 
Size  21.737 1.131 20.185 23.676 
Sales  0.024 0.193 -0.284 0.371 
SEO 0.256 0.436 0.000 1.000 
Leverage  0.293 0.156 0.061 0.533 
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Table 2 
 
The table shows summary statistics for quarterly data of nonfinancial government-linked companies listed in 
the Saudi stock market covering the term of 2010 – 2017. Note that (I/K) is the fraction of investment to whole 
assets. Q is Tobin’s Q, (CF/K) is the fraction of cash flow to whole assets. State is the percentage of shares held 
by the government, Size is the natural logarithm of whole assets, Sales is the yearly growth rate of sales, 
Leverage is a fraction of whole debt to whole assets and SEO is the seasoned equity offering dummy and it 
equals 1 if seasoned equity offering exists. 
 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
     
(I/K) 0.021 0.060 -0.863 0.542 
Q  1.456 0.612 0.792 2.799 
(CF/K)  0.032 0.018 0.001 0.059 
State  0.195 0.107 0.050 0.325 
Size  22.505 0.932 20.185 23.676 
Sales  0.029 0.177 -0.284 0.371 
SEO 0.236 0.425 0.000 1.000 
Leverage  0.301 0.154 0.061 0.533 
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Table 3 
 
The table shows summary statistics for quarterly data of nonfinancial fully privatized companies listed in the 
Saudi stock market covering the term of 2010 – 2017. Note that (I/K) is the fraction of investment to whole 
assets. Q is Tobin’s Q, (CF/K) is the fraction of cash flow to whole assets. State is the percentage of shares held 
by the government, Size is the natural logarithm of whole assets, Sales is the yearly growth rate of sales, 
Leverage is a fraction of whole debt to whole assets and SEO is the seasoned equity offering dummy and it 
equals 1 if seasoned equity offering exists. 
 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
     
(I/K) 0.017 0.085 -2.344 0.707 
Q  1.502 0.672 0.792 2.799 
(CF/K)  0.023 0.018 0.001 0.059 
State  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Size  21.324 1.006 20.185 23.676 
Sales  0.022 0.199 -0.284 0.371 
SEO 0.266 0.442 0.000 1.000 
Leverage  0.289 0.156 0.061 0.533 
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the total of the value of the year-end market, the book value of total debts, divided 
by the year-end whole assets. Cash flow is the net income adding depreciation. The 
coefficient for CF/K indicates the sensitivity of investment cash flow, which is 
generally employed in the literature as an indicator of financial constraints. D/K is 
the ratio of whole debt to whole assets. State is the percentage of shares held by the 
government. Size is calculated by the natural logarithm of the firm’s whole assets. 
    To measure the influence of government ownership of the level of financial 
constraint, I use a method that is similar to the method developed by Firth, Lin, 
and Wong (2008). I include an interactive term of cash flow and the government 
ownership to measure the influence of government ownership on the investment 
cash flow effects. The interactive term is the product of the cash flow scaled by 
whole assets and a dummy variable D-State that equals one if the biggest owner of 
the company is the government. Also, I replace the dummy variable by the 
percentage of government shares State.  
[
𝐼
𝐾
]
𝑖,t
=  𝛽1 [
𝐼
𝐾
]
𝑖,t−1
+ 𝛽2 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽4 [
𝐶𝐹
𝐾
]
𝑖,t−1
+ 𝛽5 [[
𝐶𝐹
𝐾
]
𝑖,t−1
×  𝐷𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1] +
𝛽6 [
𝐷
𝐾
]
𝑖,t−1
+ 𝛽7 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽9 𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 …(2) 
As checking for the robustness, I change the dummy variable in the 
interactive term with the government ownership percentage. The new interactive 
term is to analysis the influence of the amount of the percentage of stocks holds by 
the government on the level of financial constraints on investment.  
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[
𝐼
𝐾
]
𝑖,t
=  𝛽1 [
𝐼
𝐾
]
𝑖,t−1
+ 𝛽2 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽4 [
𝐶𝐹
𝐾
]
𝑖,t−1
+ 𝛽5 [[
𝐶𝐹
𝐾
]
𝑖,t−1
×  𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1] +
𝛽6 [
𝐷
𝐾
]
𝑖,t−1
+ 𝛽7 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽9 𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 …(3) 
6. Main variables and interactive terms 
The first measure is a combine of two models, which are accelerator type 
investment and investment Tobin’s Q. Since the Saudi stock market is not very well 
developed. I take into account investment fundamentals and I use sales growth rate 
and Tobin’s Q together to avoid any problems can be affected by market-based 
variables. Table 4 summaries the main variables used in the first measure. The 
dependent variable is investment scaled by total assets, investment is calculated as 
the difference between the fixed assets for the present year and the fixed assets for 
the prior year plus depreciation. Total assets are calculated as the total assets. The 
first independent variable is the lagged term of dependent variable to consider the 
dynamic nature of investment. Second independent variable is sales. It is calculated 
as the yearly growth ratio of sales and it is used to take into account the accelerator 
influence. Third independent variable is Tobin’s Q. It indicates the firms’ 
investment chances and it is estimated as the total of the value of the year-end 
market, the book value of total debts, divided by the year-end whole assets. Fourth 
independent variable is the cash flow to total assets. Cash flow is the sum of net 
income and depreciation. The coefficient of the cash flow to total assets indicates the 
sensitivity of investment cash flow, which is generally employed in the literature as 
an indicator of financial constraints. Fifth independent variable is the fraction of 
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total debt to total assets and is used to control the influence of the debt on the 
investment. Sixth independent variable is state. It is calculated as the percentage of 
shares held by the government. Next independent variable is size and it is 
generated by the natural logarithm of the firm’s whole assets. Last independent 
variable is the seasonal equity offering. It is a dummy variable that takes the value 
of one if a firm has SEO in a single period, and zero otherwise. It is used to capture 
the effect of the SEO on investment. 
To test the two hypotheses, I use a method that is similar to the method 
developed by Firth, Lin, and Wong (2008). I add two interactive terms of cash flow 
and the government ownership to measure the influence of government ownership 
on the investment cash flow effects. The first interactive term is the product of the 
cash flow scaled by total assets and a dummy variable, D-State, that takes the value 
of one if the biggest owner of the company is the government, and zero otherwise. 
This interactive term should tell us the type of the state influence on the level of 
financial constraints in firms. The second interactive term is the product of the cash 
flow scaled by total assets and the variable of State (measured as the percentage of 
shares held by the government). This interactive term measures the influence of the 
state ownership on financial constraint at different level of the ownership. Table 5 
summaries the two interactive terms used in the first measure. 
7. The results of the investment-cash flow sensitivity measure  
Since the level of corporation's investment is influenced by its cash flow and 
profitability, also the level of investment might affect the firm’s cash flow and 
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profitability, the problem of endogeneity is probably to happen in the equation. I 
employ the estimator of the Generalized Method of Moments developed by Arellano 
and Bond (1991) to get the results of the three models.  
Before I look at the results, I check the fitness of the model. The GMM 
estimator requires no autocorrelation in the idiosyncratic errors. The results of 
Arellano-Bond tests for serial correlation in the first-differenced errors at first order 
and second order are presented in Table 6 as m1 and m2. The p values for m1 test 
in all estimations are zero so I reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation in 
the first-differenced errors at order one. The p values for m2 test in all estimations 
are greater than 0.05 so I cannot reject the null hypothesis of no second-order 
autocorrelation. Therefore, The result of autocorrelation indicates that there is no 
model misspecification problem for the estimations. Another important thing is to 
check the validity of instruments used in the estimation by using Sargan test of 
overidentifying restrictions. The result of the test presented in Table 6 and it 
indicates that the null hypothesis of valid overidentifying restrictions cannot be 
rejected. The results of the two tests imply that the models are correctly specified 
and the instruments employed are valid. 
The findings are given in Table 7. The estimated coefficients of the lagged 
investment to whole assets are negative and significant for the first, second and 
third models. The estimated coefficients of the sales growth are insignificant in the 
three models. Tobin’s Q estimated coefficients in the three models are positive and 
significant and this is stable with the Q-model of investment. The most important  
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Table 4 
 
The table describes the main variables in the study that are used in the first measure, the cash flow sensitivity 
measure. 
 
Main Variables  Description 
Investment to Total 
Assets 
Investment is calculated as the difference between the fixed 
assets for the present year and the fixed assets for the prior year 
plus depreciation. Total assets are calculated as the total assets. 
Sales Sales variable is calculated as the yearly growth ratio of sales. 
Tobin’s Q 
Tobin’s Q is calculated as the total of the value of the year-end 
market, the book value of total debts, divided by the year-end 
whole assets. 
Cash flow to Total 
Assets 
Cash flow is calculated as the net income plus depreciation. Total 
assets are calculated as the total assets. 
Total Debt to Total 
Assets 
Total debt is calculated as the sum of long-term debt plus short-
term dept. Total assets are calculated as the total assets. 
State  State is the percentage of shares held by the government. 
Size  
Size is calculated by the natural logarithm of the firm’s total 
assets. 
SEO 
Seasonal equity offering is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of one if a firm has SEO in a single period, and zero 
otherwise.  
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Table 5 
 
The table describes the interactive terms in the study that are used in the first measure, the cash flow 
sensitivity measure.  
 
Interactive Terms  Description 
First Interactive 
Term 
It is calculated as the product of the cash flow (scaled by total 
assets) and a dummy variable D-State that equals one if the 
biggest owner of the company is the government, and zero 
otherwise. 
Second Interactive 
Term 
It is calculated as the product of the cash flow (scaled by total 
assets) and the variable of State (measured as the percentage of 
shares held by the government). 
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estimated coefficient in the first model is one of the cash flow to whole assets. It is 
positive and significant which indicates the existent of the financial constraint in 
the sample. The estimated coefficients of the leverage variable for the three models 
are insignificant. The government ownership estimated coefficient in the first model 
is insignificant however, the two coefficients of models two and three are positive 
and significant which, indicates the important role in the investments. The 
estimated coefficients of the natural logarithm of the size are significant and 
negative in the first and third models while it is insignificant in the second model. 
The estimated coefficients of the seasonal equity offering are insignificant in all 
three models. The most important is the estimated coefficients of the interactive 
terms of model two and three. In model two, the estimated coefficient of the 
interactive term is negative and significant, which confirms the first hypothesis 
that the existent of government ownership decreases the level of financial 
constraint. The estimated coefficient of the interactive term in model three is 
negative and significant which confirms the second hypothesis that the greater 
government ownership the less level of financial constraint in firms.  
The results indicate that Saudi’s privatization plan is going to make an 
influence in the terms of the soft budget constraints that the government-linked 
companies are characterized by. This finding of the relationship between 
government ownership and financial constraints in companies can be explained as 
either way, it can be evidence for the opinion of that government ownership creates 
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value to government-linked companies since it supports the companies by 
decreasing their financial constraints, or it can be evidence for the government 
involvement continues to bring in soft budget constraints to government-linked 
companies. 
8. The results of the developed KZ model 
The second measure is the developed Kaplan and Zingales index of financial 
constraints by Lamont, Polk, and Saa-Requejo (2001). Kaplan and Zingales (1997) 
challenged that companies facing greater investment-cash flow sensitivity cannot be 
an indicator of being greater financially constrained. They test various accounting 
variables and conclude that there are five important accounting variables that have 
an influence on the level of the financial constraints in companies. The five 
variables are cash flow, Tobin’s Q, debt, dividends and cash holdings. Lamont, Polk, 
and Saa-Requejo (2001) make an indicator to proxy the degree of financial 
constraints for companies by employing the estimated coefficients of the five 
variables to their own sample. The construction of the KZ index is: 
𝐾𝑍𝑖𝑡 = –  1.002 [
𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡
𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1
]  +  0.283 [𝑄𝑖𝑡] +  3.139[𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡] –  39.368 [
𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡
𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1
] –  1.315 [
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑡
𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1
]  
KZi,t is the Kaplan and Zingales index for each individual firm at time t, the 
high the KZ index indicates high financial constraints in the corporation. CF is the 
cash flow, K is the whole assets, Q is Tobin’s Q, Debt is the ratio of whole debt to 
whole assets, and Cash is the liquidity. I generate the KZ index for my sample. I  
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Table 6 
 
The table reports the result of the autocorrelation test and Sargan test to see statistical fitness of the three 
equations of the first model. 
 
Tests (1) (2) (3) 
     
m1 -3.6819 -3.6983 -3.6814 
  [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
m2 1.0136 1.0157 1.0095 
  [0.31] [0.30] [0.31] 
Sargan Test 17.2 34.32 29.97 
  [0.71] [0.41] [0.34] 
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Table 7 
 
The table shows the results of models 1-3 using GMM estimator. The dependent variable is the fraction of 
investment to whole assets. The p-value presented in the parentheses. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
     
[I/K] -0.0605 -0.0598 -0.0612 
  [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Sales -0.0006 -0.001 -0.0005 
  [0.88] [0.81] [0.91] 
Q 0.0099 0.0074 0.0093 
  [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
(CF/K) 0.1284 0.2257 0.1812 
  [0.02] [0.00] [0.00] 
(D/K) 0.0028 -0.0042 0.0015 
  [0.63] [0.47] [0.79] 
(CF/K)*Dstate  -0.4816  
   [0.00]  
(CF/K)*State   -1.8525 
    [0.00] 
State 0.0043 0.0065 0.0213 
  [0.36] [0.07] [0.00] 
Size -0.0016 0.0004 -0.0009 
  [0.06] [0.63] [0.32] 
SEO -0.0015 -0.0017 -0.0018 
  [0.60] [0.55] [0.55] 
Number of observations 1631 1631 1631 
Number of firms 85 85 85 
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generate the KZ index for each corporation -quarter observation. The mean value of 
the KZ index for the whole sample is 0.15. The standard deviation is 2.42. 
To check if there is any relationship among the KZ index and the government 
ownership, I use fixed effect estimator and I regress the KZ index on government 
ownership. Additionally, I add size as a control variable because it is not included in 
the structure of the index.  
𝐾𝑍𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽1  +  𝛽2 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽3 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡  + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 
State is government ownership. First, I use it as a dummy that takes the 
value of one when the government ownership exists and then I use it as a 
percentage. Size is calculated by the natural logarithm of the firm’s whole assets. 
The findings are given in Table 8. The estimated coefficient of the dummy 
state is significant and negative which indicates that the existent of government 
ownership decreases financial constraint in firms. This finding is constant with the 
results of the first measure and confirms the first hypothesis. The estimated 
coefficient of the state as a ratio of the government ownership is significant and 
negative which indicates that the higher government ownership percentage the less 
financial constraint in firms. This finding is constant with the findings of the first 
measure and confirms the second hypothesis. The size estimated coefficients are 
both significant and positive suggesting the greater size the higher financial 
constraint. The results show evidence that the listed companies with government 
ownership face a lower level of financial constraints. The results indicate that 
 
 29 
Saudi’s privatization plan (2030 vision) is going to make an influence in the terms of 
the soft budget constraints that the government-linked companies are characterized 
by. 
9. Conclusion 
The government-linked firms are known as inefficient firms and they could 
perform better if they were under private ownership. Many studies report the low 
performance of state-owned firms comparing with fully private firms (Dewenter and 
Malatesta, 2001, Alfaraih, Alanezi, Almujamed 2012, and Boubakri, Guedhami, 
Kwok and Saffar 2016). However, government ownership may signify to the market 
because it affords firm credibility and assures investors, markets, and suppliers 
since the government is willing to protect deals with these sides. Eljelly (2009) finds 
that government-related companies in Saudi Arabia manage to generally perform 
better than private companies with regard to income and operating efficiently. The 
reason for this better performance is that the Saudi government manages economic 
development. Financial constraints have a negative effect on companies. Campello, 
Graham, and Harvey (2010) conclude to that throughout the credit crisis in 2008, 
many firms avoid attractive projects opportunities due to the inability to externally 
borrow. Cleary (1999) argues that firm investment decisions are directly related to 
financial factors. 
In this study, I add to the literature by examining the influence of 
government ownership on the level of financial constraints of firms in the case 
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where the government may have a positive effect. The aim of this research is to 
examine the differences of influences of financial constraint among the Saudi listed 
government-related firms and the Saudi listed private firms. Many studies have 
discussed the influence of the state ownership on the level of financial constraints in 
the Chinese firms such as Poncet, Steingress, and Vandenbussche (2010) and 
Guariglia, Liu, and Song (2011). My study is different than previous studies in 
many aspects. I emphasize the study on only the listed companies with government 
ownership while the previous studies use both listed and non-listed companies. In 
my opinion, listed companies with government ownership usually are clearer and 
have improved corporate governance mechanisms than the non-listed. Moreover, 
the previous studies use only one measure of the financial constraints on the 
investments, which is the investment cash flow sensitivity. Since there is no 
optimal measure of the financial constraints, I use two measures of the financial 
constraints on the investments to study the influence of the government ownership 
and level of the financial constraints. Also, I control for the effect of the Seasoned 
Equity Offerings of companies. Finally, this is the first paper to study the influence 
of government ownership on the level of financial constraints among Saudi 
companies.  
The data used in the study is quarterly and it covers nonfinancial companies 
listed on the Saudi stock market for the period of 2010 to 2017. The total number of 
companies included in the study is 86 companies. The government owns partially in 
31 companies. I use two measures to measure the level of financial constraints. 
 
 31 
First, I use two standard investment equations, which is a pool of two models, 
accelerator type investment and investment Tobin’s Q. Second, I use the developed 
Kaplan and Zingales’s financial constraints index by Lamont, Polk, and Saa-
Requejo (2001). The findings support the two hypotheses, the related government 
firms suffer less financial constraint than the fully privatized firms and the more 
government ownership percent the less level of financial constraint in the Saudi 
stock market. This positive influence can be caused by the willingness of the Saudi 
government to support a company’s equity by increasing its capital.  
This finding of the relationship between government ownership and financial 
constraints in companies can be explained as either way, it can be evidence for the 
opinion of that government ownership creates value to government-linked 
companies since it supports the companies by decreasing their financial constraints, 
or it can be evidence for the government involvement continues to bring in soft 
budget constraints to government-linked companies 
I show evidence that the listed companies with government ownership face a 
lower level of financial constraints. The finding is important because it provides 
evidence that having a higher ratio of government ownership decreases the level to 
which the company is financially constrained. The results indicate that Saudi’s 
privatization plan is going to make an influence in the terms of the soft budget 
constraints that the government-linked companies are characterized by. This study 
adds to the literature of the state ownership in a different aspect, where the state 
ownership affects positively companies’ values. Also, the study contributes to the 
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literature of financial constraints, and financial markets. Also, it helps to give an 
explanation of the influence of government ownership on the firms’ values with 
financial constraints. 
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Table 8 
 
The table shows the results of the developed KZ model using fixed effect estimator. The dependent variable is 
the KZ index. The p-value presented in the parentheses. 
  (1) (2) 
State Dummy  
-0.8252  
[0.025]  
State Shares Ratio  
 -8.8316 
 [0.002] 
Size  
0.9143 0.8854 
[0.000] [0.000] 
Constant  
-7.1653 -6.4453 
[0.001] [0.002] 
Observations  1787 1787 
Firms  91 91 
R2 0.0197 0.0325 
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CHAPTER 2 
Determinants of Capital Structure and Government Ownership, Evidence 
from Saudi Arabia 
1. Introduction 
The capital structure factors have been discussed a lot in the literature. It 
began with Modigliani and Miller (1958) who argued that the capital structure is 
irrelevant to firm value. But later in their study (1963) after considering the 
benefits of interests paid on debts are deductible, they conclude that the optimal 
capital structure is determined by the benefits of interests. Later hundreds of 
papers have studied the factors of capital structure in the United State and other 
countries. In this paper, I study the determinants of the capital structure of the 
Saudi listed firms.   
Some scholars may believe that the linked government firms have lower 
profitability Dewenter and Malatesta (2001). However, government ownership may 
signify to the market because it affords firm credibility and assures investors, 
markets, and suppliers since the government is willing to protect deals with these 
sides. Eljelly (2009) finds that government-related companies in Saudi Arabia 
manage to generally perform better than private companies with regard to income 
and operating efficiently. The reason for this better performance is that the Saudi 
government manages economic development by owning fully or partially major 
companies such as oil and petrochemical companies. 
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In this paper, I test the influence of specific company factors and the 
government ownership factor on the capital structure of the Saudi listed companies 
covering the period of 2010 - 2017. Using three measures of leverage, whole debt to 
whole assets, long-term debt to whole assets, and short-term debt to whole assets. I 
follow Rajan and Zingales (1995) and I use four specific company factors, firm size, 
the tangibility of assets, profitability and growth. Also, I include government 
ownership as an effective factor. It is expecting that the tangibility of assets and 
size have a positive association with leverage. In contrast, leverage is negatively 
correlated with growth and profitably. There are few studies that determent the 
capital structure of the Saudi listed firms such as (Abdullah 2001, Alzomaia 2015). 
However, none of them study the effects of government ownership on the capital 
structure.  
Using the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator, the findings 
show that all the three measures have the compatible results confirming the 
hypotheses except the third measure where the estimated coefficient of the fixed 
assets to whole assets has a negative correlation with the ratio of short-term debt to 
whole assets. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follow. Section 2 provides a literature 
review. The determinants of leverage and the hypotheses of the study are presented 
in section 3. The data and the methodology are in section 4 and 5, respectively. 
Section 6 describes the findings. Section 7 concludes the study. 
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2. Literature Review 
2.1 Capital Structure 
Two majors theories have discussed the capital structure, trade-off theory 
and pecking order theory. Miller (1977) presents the trade-off theory. Since the cost 
of debt is less than the cost of equity, a company can get the benefit and increases 
the level of debt until it gets the optimal degree of debt. Pecking order theory is 
discussed by Myers (1984). He says companies prefer financing sources in order, 
internal financing first, debt second and finally financing by equity. 
Many empirical studies investigate the capital structure determinants. 
Warner (1977) argues the influence of bankruptcy costs in the capital structure. 
Warner finds no significant evidence that the bankruptcy costs can be a 
determinant factor for the capital structure. In contrast, Altman (1984) examines 
predictable profits and actual profits and finds that the bankruptcy cost is not 
shallow. Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim (1984) use cross-sectional, firm-specific data to 
study the capital structure. The results show that the ratios of firm leverage are 
correlated negatively to the volatility of earnings indicating that there is a 
significant cost of financial deficit. Also, they discover a positive correlation between 
leverage and non-tax shields. Crutchley and Hansen (1989) examine the equity 
agency costs that happen between managers and stockholders. They find that 
increases in earnings volatility have a negative influence on leverage. Similarly, 
increasing discretionary expense decreases the use of debt. Furthermore, the 
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findings show that the larger firm size the more debt used. Rajan and Zingales 
(1995) study the determinants of the capital structure of seven countries, United 
State, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, Japan, and Canada. They find a 
positive link among tangibility of assets and leverage. Also, they find a negative 
correlation among the market to book ratio and leverage except in Italy. Moreover, 
the findings show that a positive association among size and leverage except in 
Germany. Finally, the authors capture a negative association among profitability 
and leverage except in Germany. Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc‐Kunt, and Maksimovic 
(2001) study the determinants of the capital structure of ten growing nations, 
Brazil, Indi, Pakistan, Turkey, Mexico, Zimbabwe, Jordan, Korea, Thailand, and 
Malaysia. They find a negative correlation between profitability and leverage. 
However, the findings show a positive link between size and leverage. Also, there is 
a positive link among tangibility of assets and leverage. Deesomsak, Paudyal, and 
Pescetto (2004), investigate the determinants of the capital structure of companies 
in four countries of the Asia Pacific countries. They find that different legal, 
financial and institutional environments have an impact on the capital structure 
determinants. 
Gaud, Jani, Hoesli, and Bender (2005) study the factors of the capital 
structure for corporations listed in the stock exchange in Switzerland. They find 
that the size of corporations and the tangible assets are positively correlated to 
leverage. Also, the findings show that growth and profitability are negatively 
related to leverage. Frank and Goyal (2009) study the significance of many factors 
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in the capital structure of publicly traded corporations in the United State. They 
capture that median industry leverage, tangibility, the log of assets, and expected 
inflation are positively correlated to leverage. But market‐to‐book assets percentage 
and profits are negatively correlated to leverage. Also, the results show that 
dividend‐paying firms have lower leverage. Cespedes, Gonzalez, and Molina (2009) 
study the capital structure of companies in Latin America. The results show that 
Latin American companies prefer debt to equity. 
Huang and Song (2005) investigate the capital structure characteristics using 
1200 Chinese-listed companies. They find that leverage is affected by firm size and 
fixed assets positively while with profitability, non-debt tax shields, growth 
opportunity, managerial shareholdings and correlates with industries affect 
leverage negatively. State ownership is found to have no significant influence on the 
leverage level. Li, ,Yue, and Zhao (2009) study the influence of ownership structure 
and institutional development in debt financing of non-publicly traded Chinese 
firms. They conclude that state ownership is positively related to leverage and 
firms’ access to long-term debt, however, foreign ownership is negatively related to 
all measures of leverage.  Unexpectedly, they find that companies in better-grown 
regions are correlated with less access to long-term debt, signifying the availability 
of other financing resources. Also, state-owned companies’ easy access to long-
standing debt is positively related to long-standing investment and negatively 
related to firm performance. Finally, they find that in less grown regions non-state-
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owned companies manage to have lower total and short-term debt than their state-
owned companies. 
Goh, Tai, Rasli, Tan, and Zakuan (2018) study the determinants of capital 
structure for listed Malaysian industrial corporations covering the period of 2011 to 
the year 2014. They find that firm profitability and non-debt tax shield are 
negatively associated with leverage. However, the authors find that ownership 
concentration, separation of CEO-chairs, board independence, are not associated 
with leverage. Also, Liquidity, firm size and asset structure are not associated with 
leverage.  
Fan, Titman, and Twite (2010) study the impact of the institutional 
environment on capital structure in 39 developed and developing nations. The 
results show that a country’s legal and tax system and the degree of corruption 
describe an important part of the changing in leverage and debt maturity ratios. 
The findings imply that companies in nations that are considered as more corrupt 
use less equity and higher debt, whereas companies operating in nations that have 
better legal systems have more equity. 
2.2 Government Ownership 
The connection between ownership structure and capital structure supports 
the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. Shleifer and 
Vishny (1986) argue that external block-holders can decrease managerial 
opportunism that may arise from lower direct agency disagreements between 
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management and shareholders. Companies that have large external block-holdings are 
probable to have greater debt. 
The effects of the owners have been discussed as a related factor to the 
efficiency. Some scholars argue that government ownership affects efficiency 
negatively. Ramamurti (1987) argues that government-linked companies (GLCs) 
goal is other than a wealth-maximizing goal. Krueger (1990) believes that there as a 
lot of pressure on GLCs to employ politically related people while there are better 
professional people who can be hired. Also, Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1996) say 
that the government may force GLCs to hire excess employs. Another reason for the 
low-efficiency performance in GLCs can be related to the bureaucratic in 
management (Chang and Singh 1997). Moreover, there are no sufficient motivations 
for managers to follow efficiency and profitability. However, Jones (1991) argues 
that privatization delivers management of government-linked companies to clear 
goals about what government policies need. Conversely, Christensen (1998) finds 
that government-owned organizations in some states have low-efficiency 
performance even after reorganizations are announced. Micco and Panizza (2007) 
study the connection between ownership in banks and performance among data of 
commercial banks in 179 states. They find government-owned banks operating have 
poorer income and greater expenses than the non-government-owned banks.  
As some scholars find a negative effect of government ownership. Some 
scholars support the firm out-performance with government ownership. Dewenter 
and Malatesta (1997) contend that governments can monitor the GLCs chiefs better 
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than isolated stakeholders in non-GLCs. Chang and Singh (1997) argue that GLCs 
do not always have lower efficiency than private companies. Khwaja and Mian 
(2005) categorize a company as political if its executive contributes in an election, 
the authors study the level, type, and economic costs of “political rent provision”. 
They find that political rents are stronger with the increase of the firm's politician, 
and political rents decrease with the decreasing of the level of electoral 
participation. Khwaja and Mian also find that political rents increase with the 
strength of the firm's politician and whether he or his party is in power, and fall 
with the degree of electoral participation in his constituency. 
Some scholars claim that government ownership signifies a significant 
indication to the market because it provides firm credibility and guarantees 
financiers and markets, and suppliers because of the government ability to protect 
dealings with them. Bourdman and Vining (1989) study ownership depends on 
three groups of ownership: state-owned, non-state-owned, and mixed owned. They 
find that fractional privatization is a better plan for a government that does not 
want the state ownership form. Ang and Ding (2006) compare the GLCs and the 
fully privatized companies in term of financial and market performance in 
Singapore. The finding shows that corporate governance and the valuations in 
GLCs are better and higher. Omran (2004) shows that there is no development 
difference in performance in Egyptian non-state-owned companies and state-linked 
corporations. Kole and Mulherin (1997) study the case in the United States and 
Bozec (2003) in Canada find Similar results for different reasons. 
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3. The Determinants of Leverage and Hypotheses 
Harris and Raviv (1991) claim that fixed assets, growth opportunities, firm 
size, and profitability affect leverage. Based on this argument, I test the four 
variables. Also, I include government ownership as an effective factor. The 
tangibility of assets could help as security for repayment loans. The tangibility of 
assets is measured as the ratio of whole fixed assets to whole assets. The higher 
ratio of tangible assets to whole assets increases the firm ability to borrow loans.  
Myers (1977) claims that firms are more probably to forgo profitable projects 
when they are highly leveraged. Therefore, Rajan and Zengales (1995) argue that 
companies use more equity financing when they forecasting high growth in the 
future. To proxy the growth, I employ the percentage of the market value of assets 
to the book value of assets. The correlation between leverage and growth is 
estimated to be negative. 
Large companies are usually more diversified and they fail less regularly. So 
size can be used as an opposite proxy of bankruptcy. Therefore, size is expected to 
affect leverage positively. Size is calculated as the logarithm of sales. 
The influence of profitability on leverage is still unclear. The trade-off theory 
claims that the cost of debt is not more than the cost of the equity, it is less. A 
company can get the benefit of the tax shield and increases the level of debt until it 
receives the best level of debt. However, Pecking order theory claims that 
corporations choose financing ways in order, internal financing first, debt second 
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and finally financing by equity. In the case of Saudi Arabia, there is no benefit of 
tax since there is no corporate tax. The profitability is estimated as the ratio of 
income to whole assets. It is expecting that profitability has a negative relationship 
on leverage. 
Finally, government ownership has an influence on companies. The fact that 
Saudi government financial position is strong and the government manages the 
economic development by owning partially major companies arises a question about 
how the government affects the leverage position in the corporations listed in the 
Saudi stock market. The linked government corporations seem to have less 
difficulty to raise their equities since the government supports them. The influence 
of government ownership is expected to be negative on the leverage level. 
Government ownership is measured as the ratio of shares owned by the 
government. Table 8 summarizes the determinants of the leverage. 
4. Data 
The data I use in the study is quarterly and it covers nonfinancial 
corporations listed on Saudi stock market for the term of 2010 to 2017. The 
accounting data is from global Campustat. Government ownership data is hand 
collected. The Saudi government ownership can be in three forms, the public 
investments funds (PIF), the general organization for social insurance and the 
public pension agency. The total number of firms included in the study is 86 firms. 
The government owns partially in 31 firms. Table 9 presents summary statistics. 
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Table 9 
 
The table describes the determinants of leverage used in the three measures, total debt to total assets, the long-
term debt to total assets, the short-term debt to total assets. 
 
Determinants of 
Leverage  
Description 
Tangibility of 
Assets  
The tangibility of assets could help as security for repayment loans. 
The tangibility of assets is measured as the ratio of whole fixed assets 
to whole assets. 
Profitability  
In the case of Saudi Arabia, there is no benefit of tax since there is no 
corporate tax. Based on the trade-off theory and pecking order theory, 
it is expecting that profitability has a negative relationship on 
leverage. The profitability is estimated as the ratio of income to whole 
assets. 
Growth  
Firms are more probably to forgo profitable projects when they are 
highly leveraged. The correlation between leverage and growth is 
estimated to be negative. Growth is calculated as the fraction of the 
market value of assets to the book value of assets. 
Size 
Size can be used as an opposite proxy of bankruptcy so it is expected 
to affect leverage positively. Size is calculated as the logarithm of 
sales.  
State  
The linked government corporations seem to have less difficulty to 
raise their equities since the government supports them. The 
influence of government ownership is expected to be negative on the 
leverage level. Government ownership is measured as the ratio of 
shares owned by the government. 
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The mean average of the whole debt to whole assets is %29. The mean 
average of the long-term debt to whole assets is %18. The mean average of the 
short-term debt to whole assets is %11. The mean average of the tangibility of 
assets is %63. The size average is 5.17. The mean average of the return on assets is 
%2. The growth rate mean average is 1.6. Finally, the average of government 
ownership is %7. 
5. Methodology  
To investigate the effect of the factors on the level of leverage in companies, I 
follow the literature and use three measures of the leverage. The first measure is 
the whole debt to whole assets. The second measure is the long-term debt to whole 
assets. The third measure is the short-term debt to whole assets. I follow Rajan and 
Zingales (1995) and I estimate the three basic regressions and I add the state-
ownership as a fifth factor: 
[
𝐷
𝐾
]
𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽1 [𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠]𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽2 [𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ]𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽3 [𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒]𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽4 [𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦]𝑖𝑡  +
𝛽5 [𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒]𝑖𝑡  + 𝑒𝑖𝑡      …(1) 
[
𝐿𝑇𝐷
𝐾
]
𝑖𝑡
 =  𝛽1 [𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠]𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽2 [𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ]𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽3 [𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒]𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽4 [𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦]𝑖𝑡  +
𝛽5 [𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒]𝑖𝑡  + 𝑒𝑖𝑡      …(2) 
[
𝑆𝑇𝐷
𝐾
]
𝑖𝑡
 =  𝛽1 [𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠]𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽2 [𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ]𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽3 [𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒]𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽4 [𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦]𝑖𝑡  +
𝛽5 [𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒]𝑖𝑡  + 𝑒𝑖𝑡     …(3) 
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Table 10 
 
The table shows summary statistics for quarterly data of nonfinancial corporations listed in the Saudi stock 
market for the term of 2010 – 2017. Note that (D/K) is the fraction of whole debt to whole assets. (LD/K) is the 
ratio of long-term debt to whole assets, (SD/K) is the ratio of short-term debt to whole assets. The tangibility of 
assets is measured as the fraction of fixed assets to total assets. Size is calculated as the logarithm of sales. 
The profitability is calculated as the fraction of income to whole assets. Growth is measured as a fraction of the 
market value of assets to the book value of assets. State is the ratio of direct shareholding by the state. 
 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
     
(D/K) 0.293 0.156 0.061 0.533 
(LD/K) 0.177 0.135 0.021 0.425 
(SD/K) 0.109 0.101 0.010 0.311 
Tangibility of Assets 0.626 0.201 0.000 0.998 
Size  5.174 1.378 2.872 7.368 
Profitability  0.018 0.017 -0.005 0.048 
Market to Book 1.618 1.080 0.453 3.777 
State  0.067 0.112 0.000 0.325 
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The subscript i represents individual firms, and the subscript t represents 
the current quarter. D is the total debt. K is the whole assets. The tangibility of 
Assets is the fraction of fixed assets to whole assets. Growth is the fraction of the 
market value of assets to the book value of assets. Size is the logarithm of sales. 
Profitability is the fraction of income to whole assets. The state is the percentage of 
shares owned by the government. To avoid any endogeneity between the 
explanatory variables I use the estimator of developed generalized method of 
moments (GMM) by Arellano and Bond (1991).  
6. The results  
Before I look at the results, I check the fitness of the models. The GMM 
estimator requires no autocorrelation in the idiosyncratic errors. The results of 
Arellano-Bond tests for serial correlation in the first-differenced errors at first order 
and second order are presented in Table 11 as m1 and m2 respectively for the three 
models. The p values for the m1 test in all estimations are zero so I reject the null 
hypothesis of no serial correlation in the first-differenced errors at order one. The p 
values for the m2 test in all estimations are greater than 0.05 so I cannot reject the 
null hypothesis of no second-order autocorrelation. Therefore, The result of 
autocorrelation indicates that there is no model misspecification problem for the 
three estimations. Another important thing is to check the validity of instruments 
used in the estimation by using the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions. The 
result of the test presented in Table 11. It indicates that the null hypothesis of valid 
overidentifying restrictions cannot be rejected. Therefore, the results of the two 
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tests of the fitness of the models imply that the models are correctly specified and 
the instruments employed are valid.  
The results of the first measure are presented in Table 12. The estimated 
coefficient of the fixed assets to whole assets is positive but insignificant. However, 
The estimated coefficient of growth is negative and significant confirming the 
second hypothesis. Size estimated coefficient is positive and significant and it 
confirms the third hypothesis that size is expected to affect leverage positively. The 
estimated coefficient of profitability is negative and significant confirming the 
fourth hypothesis that profitability affects leverage negatively. Finally, the 
estimated coefficient of government ownership is negative and significant which 
confirms the hypothesis that government ownership has a negative relationship 
with leverage. 
Table 13 presents the results of the second measure, where the dependent 
variable is the ratio of the long-term debt to whole assets. The estimated coefficient 
of the fixed assets to whole assets is positive but it is insignificant. The estimated 
coefficient of growth is negative and significant confirming the second hypothesis. 
Size estimated coefficient is positive and significant and it confirms the third 
hypothesis that size is expected to affect leverage positively. The estimated 
coefficient of profitability is negative and significant confirming the fourth 
hypothesis that profitability affects leverage negatively. Finally, the estimated 
coefficient of government ownership is negative and significant.  
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Finally, Table 14 presents the results of the third measure, where the 
dependent variable is the ratio of the short-term debt to whole assets. The 
estimated coefficient of the fixed assets to whole assets is negative and significant. 
The estimated coefficient of growth is negative and significant confirming the 
second hypothesis. The estimated coefficient of size is positive and significant and it 
confirms the third hypothesis that size is expected to affect leverage positively. The 
estimated coefficient of profitability is negative and significant confirming the 
fourth hypothesis that profitability affects leverage negatively. Finally, the 
estimated coefficient of government ownership is negative and significant.  
In summary, all the three measures have the compatible results confirming 
the hypotheses except the third measure where the estimated coefficient of the fixed 
assets to whole assets has a negative association with the ratio of short-term debt to 
whole assets. Growth is negatively associated with leverage. This finding matches 
the claim of Myers (1977) and Rajan and Zengales (1995) argument that firms are 
more probably to forgo profitable projects when they are highly leveraged. The 
profitability is negatively connected with leverage. The finding is compatible with 
the pecking order system. Firm size affects leverage level positively, the larger firm 
size means more diversified firm and less risk therefore, the more firm’s ability to 
borrow. The results suggest that government-linked companies have less leverage 
ratio comparing with the fully privatizing companies. This indicates the more 
availability of alternative financial resources for the government-linked companies 
in Saudi Arabia.  
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7. Conclusion 
The capital structure factors have been discussed heavily in the literature. It began 
with Modigliani and Miller (1958) who argue that the capital structure is irrelevant 
to firm value. But later in their study (1963) after considering the benefits of 
interests paid on debts are deductible, they conclude that the optimal capital 
structure is determined by the benefits of interests. Later hundreds of papers have 
studied the factors of capital structure in the United State and other countries. 
Harris and Raviv (1991) find that fixed assets, growth opportunities, firm size, and 
profitability affect leverage. Some scholars may believe that the linked government 
firms have lower profitability Dewenter and Malatesta (2001). However, 
government ownership may signify to the market because it affords firm credibility 
and assures investors, markets, and suppliers since the government is willing to 
protect deals with these sides. Eljelly (2009) finds that government-related 
companies in Saudi Arabia manage to generally perform better than private 
companies with regard to income and operating efficiently. 
Based on the previous argument, I follow Rajan and Zingales (1995) and I 
investigate the influences of the four variables. Also, I include government 
ownership as an effective factor. The tangibility of assets could help as security for 
repayment loans. Myers (1977) claims that firms are more probably to forgo 
profitable projects when they are highly leveraged. Therefore, Rajan and Zengales 
(1995) argue that companies use more equity financing when they forecasting high 
growth in the future. Large companies are usually more diversified and they fail 
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less regularly. So size can be used as an opposite proxy of bankruptcy. In the case of 
Saudi Arabia, there is no benefit of tax since there is no corporate tax. Based on the 
trade-off theory and pecking order theory, it is expecting that profitability has a 
negative relationship on leverage. Finally, The linked government corporations 
seem to have less difficulty to raise their equities since Saudi government supports 
them. The influence of government ownership is expected to be negative on the 
leverage level. 
The data I use in the study is quarterly and it covers nonfinancial 
corporations listed on Saudi stock market for the term of 2010 to 2017. I follow the 
literature and use three measures of leverage, total debt to total assets, long-term 
debt to total assets, and short-term debt to total assets. I follow Rajan and Zingales 
(1995) and I use four specific company factors, firm size, the tangibility of assets, 
profitability and growth. Also, I include government ownership as an effective 
factor. 
Using the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator, the findings 
show that all the three measures have the compatible results confirming the 
hypotheses except the third measure where the estimated coefficient of the fixed 
assets to whole assets has a negative correlation with the ratio of short-term debt to 
whole assets. Growth is negatively associated with leverage. This finding matches 
the claim of Myers (1977) and Rajan and Zengales (1995) argument that firms are 
more probably to forgo profitable projects when they are highly leveraged. The 
profitability is negatively connected with leverage. The finding is compatible with 
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the pecking order theory. Firm size affects leverage level positively, the larger firm 
size means more diversified firm and less risk therefore, the more firm’s ability to 
borrow. The results suggest that government-linked companies have less leverage 
ratio comparing with the fully privatizing companies. This indicates the more 
availability of alternative financial resources for the government-linked companies 
in Saudi Arabia. This is the first study that investigates the influence of 
government ownership on the capital structure in Saudi Arabia. 
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Table 11 
 
The table reports the result of the autocorrelation test and Sargan test to see statistical fitness of the three 
models. 
 
Tests (1) (2) (3) 
     
m1 -2.9847 -4.8113 -4.7143 
  [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
m2 1.0168 1.2865 1.0601 
  [0.31] [0.19] [0.29] 
Sargan Test 18.2 15.6 11.6 
  [0.71] [0.75] [0.78] 
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Table 12 
 
The table shows the findings of models 1 using GMM estimator. The dependent variable is the fraction of the 
whole debt to whole assets. The p-value presented in the parentheses. 
 
  (1) 
  
 
Tangibility of Assets 0.0056 
  [0.17] 
Growth -0.0125 
  [0.00] 
Size 0.0102 
  [0.00] 
Profitability -0.4554 
  [0.00] 
State -0.0342 
  [0.00] 
Number of observations 1562 
Number of firms 84 
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Table 13 
 
The table shows the findings of models 2 using GMM estimator. The dependent variable is the fraction of long-
term debt to whole assets. The p-value presented in the parentheses. 
 
  (2) 
  
 
Tangibility of Assets 0.0635 
  [0.00] 
Growth -0.0067 
  [0.00] 
Size 0.0068 
  [0.00] 
Profitability -0.3073 
  [0.00] 
State -0.0081 
  [0.03] 
Number of observations 1706 
Number of firms 85 
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Table 14 
 
The table shows the findings of models 3 using GMM estimator. The dependent variable is the fraction of short-
term debt to whole assets. The p-value presented in the parentheses. 
 
  (3) 
  
 
Tangibility of Assets -0.0778 
  [0.00] 
Growth -0.0048 
  [0.00] 
Size 0.0021 
  [0.00] 
Profitability -0.348 
  [0.00] 
State -0.0282 
  [0.00] 
Number of observations 1710 
Number of firms 87 
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